Full Album.... a wink from the stones...
webmaster note: Maybe the Queen is just window dressing but someone in England has always had HUGE power to get what they want in any manner necessary...
Excerpt from Tarpley's biography of Bush, shows orders coming from England...
Bush's meetings with Thatcher in Aspen on Thursday, August 2, and on Monday, August 6 at the
White House are of the most decisive importance in understanding the way in which the AngloAmericans connived to unleash the Gulf war. Before meeting with Thatcher, Bush was clearly in an
agitated and disturbed mental state, but had no bedrock committment to act in the Gulf crisis. After
the sessions with Thatcher, Bush was rapidly transformed into a raving, monomaniacal warmonger
and hawk. The transition was accompanied by a marked accentuation of Bush's overall
psychological impairment, with a much increased tendency towards rage episodes.
The impact of Bush's Aspen meeting with Thatcher was thus to brainwash Bush towards a greater
psychological disintegration, and towards a greater pliability and suggestibility in regard's to
London's imperial plans. One can speculate that the "Iron Lady" was armed with a Tavistock
Institute psychological profile of Bush, possibly centering on young George's feelings of
inadequacy when he was denied the love of his cold, demanding Anglo-Saxon sportswoman
mother. Perhaps Thatcher's underlying psychological gameplan in this (and previous) encounters
with Bush was to place herself along the line of emotional cathexis associated in Bush's psyche with
the internalized image of his mother Dorothy, especially in her demanding and domineering
capacity as the grey eminence of the Ranking Committee. George had to do something to save the
embattled English-speaking peoples, Thatcher might have hinted. Otherwise, he would be letting
down the side in precisely the way which he had always feared would lose him his mother's love.
But to do something for the Anglo-Saxons in their hour of need, George would have to be selfless
and staunch and not think of himself, just as mother Dorothy had always demanded: he would have
to risk his entire political career by deploying US forces in overwhelming strength to the Gulf. This
might have been the underlying emotional content of Thatcher's argument.
On a more explicit level, Thatcher also possessed an array of potent arguments. Back in 1982, she
might have recalled, she had fallen in the polls and was being written off for a second term as a
result of her dismal economic performance. But then the Argentinians seized the Malvinas, and she,
Thatcher, acting in defiance of her entire cabinet and of much of British public opinion, had sent the
fleet into the desperate gamble of the Malvinas war. The British had reconquered the islands, and
the resultant wave of jingoism and racist chauvinism had permitted Thatcher to consolidate her
regime until the present day. Thatcher knew about the "no new taxes" controversy and the Neil
Bush affair, but all of that would be quickly suppressed and forgotten once the regiments began tomarch off to the Saudi front. For Bush, this would have been a compelling package.
As far as Saddam Hussein was concerned, Thatcher's argument is known to have been built around
the ominous warning, "He won't stop!" Her message was that MI-6 and the rest of the fabled British
intelligence apparatus had concluded that Saddam Hussein's goal would be an immediate military
invasion and occupation of the immense Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, with its sensitive Moslem holy
places, its trackless deserts and its warlike Bedouins. Since Thatcher was familar with Bush's racist
contempt for Arabs and other dark-skinned peoples, which she emphatically shared, she would also
have laid great stress on the figure of Saddam Hussein and the threat he posed to Anglo-Saxon
interests. The Tavistock profile would have included how threatened Bush felt in his psycho-sexual
impotence by tough customers like Saddam, whom nobody had ever referred to as little Lord
At this moment in the Gulf crisis, the only competent political-military estimate of Iraqi intentions
was that Saddam Hussein had no intent of going beyond Kuwait, a territory to which Baghdad had a
long-standing claim, arguing that the British Empire had illegally established its secret protectorate
over the southern part of the Ottoman Empire's province of Basra in 1899. This estimate that Iraq
had no desire to become embroiled with Saudi Arabia was repeated during the first week of the
crisis by such qualified experts as former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia James Aikens, and by
the prominent French military leader Gen. Lacaze. Even General Schwarzkopf though it highly
unlikely that Saddam would move against Saudi Arabia.
In her public remarks in Aspen, Thatcher began the new phase in the racist demonization of
Saddam Hussein by calling his actions "intolerable" in a way that Syrian and Israeli occupations of
other countries' lands seemingly were not. She asserted that "a collective and effective will of the
nations belonging to the UN" would be necessary to deal with the crisis. Thatcher's travelling
entourage from the Foreign Office had come equipped with a strategy to press for mandatory
economic sanctions and possible mandatory military action against Iraq under the provisions of
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Soon Bush's entourage had also picked up this new fad.
Bush had now changed his tune markedly. He had suddenly and publicly re-acquired his military
options. When asked about his response, he stated:
We're not ruling any options in but we're not ruling any options out.
Bush also revealed that he had told the Arab leaders with whom he had been in contact during the
morning that the Gulf crisis "had gone beyond simply a regional dispute because of the naked
aggression that violates the United Nations charter." These formulations were I.D. format Thatcherspeak. Bush condemned Saddam for "his intolerable behavior," again parrotting Thatcher's line.
Bush was now "very much concerned" about the safety of other small Gulf states. Bush also
referred to the hostage question, saying that threats to American citizens would "affect the United
States in a very dramatic way because I view a fundamental responsibility of my presidency [as
being] to protect American citzens." Bush added that he had talked with Thatcher about British
proposals to press for "collective efforts" by members of the United Nations against Iraq. The Iraqi
invasion was a "totally unjustified act," Bush went on. It was now imperative that the "international
community act together to ensure that Iraqi forces leave Kuwait immediately. Bush revealed that he
and his advisors were now examing the "next steps" to end the crisis. Bush said he was "somewhat
heartened" by his telephone conversations with President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, King Hussein of
Jordan, and Gen. Ali Abdallah Salib of Yemen.
There is every reason to believe that Bush's decision to launch US military intervention and war
was taken in Aspen, under the hypnotic influence of Thatcher. Any residual hesitancy displayed insecret councils was merely dissembling to prevent his staffs from opposing that decision. Making a
strategic decision of such collossal implications on the basis of a psycho-manipulative pep talk from
Thatcher suggests that Bush's hyperthyroid condition was already operating; the hyperthyroid
patient notoriously tends to resolve complicated and far-reaching alternatives with quick, snap
decisions. Several published accounts have sought to argue that the decision for large-scale
intervention did not come until Saturday at Camp David, but these accounts belong to the "red
Studebaker" school of coverup. The truth is that Bush went to war as the racist tail on the British
imperial kite, cheered on by the Kissinger cabal that permeated and dominated his administration.
As the London Daily Telegraph gloated, Mrs. Thatcher had "stiffened [Bush's] resolve."
Bush had been scheduled to stay overnight in Aspen, but he now departed immediately for
Washington. Later, the White House said that Bush had been on the phone with Saudi King Fahd,
who had agreed that the Iraqi invasion was "absolutely unacceptable." [fn 35] On the return trip and
through the evening, the Kissingerian operative Scowcroft continued to to press for military
intervention, playing down the difficulties which other avdisers had been citing. Given Kissinger's
long-standing relationship with London and the Foreign Office, it was no surprise that Scowcroft
was fully on the London line.
Before the day was out, "the orders started flooding out of the Oval Office. The president had all of
these diplomatic pieces in his head. The UN piece. The NATO piece. The Middle east piece. He
was meticulous, methodical, and personal," according to one official. [fn 36]
The next morning was Friday, August 3, and Bush called another NSC meeting at the White House.
The establishment media like the New York Times were full of accounts of how Iraq was allegedly
massing troops along the southern border of Kuwait, about to pounce on Saudi Arabia. Scowcroft,
with Bush's approval, bludgeoned the doubters into a discussion of war options. Bush ordered the
CIA to prepare a plan to overthrow or assassinate Saddam Hussein, and told Cheney, Powell, and
Gen. Schwarzkopf to prepare military options for the next day. Bush was opening the door to war
slowly, so as to keep all of his civilian and military advisers on board. Later on Friday, Prince
Bandar, the Saudi Arabian ambassador to Washington, met with Bush. According to one version,
Bush pledged his word of honor to Bandar that he would "see this through with you." Bandar was
widely reputed to be working for the CIA and other western intelligence agencies. There were also
reports that he had Ethiopian servants in the Saudi embassy in Washington, near the Kennedy
Center, who were chattel slaves according to United Nations definitions.
When the time came in the afternoon to walk to his helicopter on the White House south lawn for
the short flight to the Camp David retreat in the Catoctin Mountains of Maryland, Bush stopped at
the microphones that were set up there, a procedure that became a habit during the Gulf crisis.
There was something about these moments of entering and leaving the White House that heightened
Bush's psychological instability; the leaving and arriving rituals would often be the moments of
some of his worst public tantrums. At this point Bush was psyching himself up towards the fit that
he would act out on his Sunday afternoon return. But there was already no doubt that Bush's
bellicosity was rising by the hour. With Kuwait under occupation, he said, "the status quo is
unacceptable and further expansion" by Iraq "would be even more unacceptable." This formulation
already pointed to an advance into Kuwait. He also stressed Saud Arabia: "If they ask for specific
help-- it depends obviously on what it is-- I would be inclined to help in any way we possibly can."
On Saturday morning, August 4, Bush met with his entourage in Camp David, present Quayle,
Cheney, Sununu, William Webster, Wolfowitz, Baker, Scowcroft, Powell, Schwarzkopf, Fitzwater,
and Richard Haas of the NSC staff. Military advisers, especially Colin Powell, appear to have
directed Bush's attention to the many problems associated with military intervention. According toone version, Gen. Schwarzkopf estimated that it would take 17 weeks to move a defensive,
deterrent force of 250,000 troops into the region, and between 8 and 12 months to assemble a
ground force capable of driving the Iraqi army out of Kuwait. For the duration of the crisis, the
Army would remain the most reluctant, while the Air Force, including Scowcroft, would be the
most eager to open hostilities. Bush sensed that he had to stress the defense of Saudi Arabia to keep
all of his bureaucratic players on board, and to garner enough public support to carry out the first
phase of the buildup.